Showing posts with label congressionally directed spending. Show all posts
Showing posts with label congressionally directed spending. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

Earmarks and Archives

Earmarks and archives are two topics near and dear to our hearts, so we obviously took notice when they both came under attack by Taxpayers for Common Sense last week.[1]  The interest group expressed disdain for a pair of $10 million earmarks included in the Defense Appropriations bill to support the organization and preservation of the congressional papers collections of late-Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and late-Representative John Murtha (D-PA).  In addition the appropriations would support the creation of the Edward M. Kennedy Institute for the United States Senate at the University of Massachusetts Boston and the John P. Murtha Center for Public Service at the University of Pittsburgh in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.

Before continuing it is important to make clear that earmarks in support of congressional papers collections are exceedingly rare; at most there have been a dozen such earmarks in the history of the country (much to the chagrin of university libraries and university administrators nationwide).

We are college professors.  Our daily lives are consumed with teaching students about American politics and political institutions, and conducting academic research focused on Congress, the president, and appropriations politics.  In our research we rely heavily on the archived papers of members of Congress and, to some extent, presidents.  Between the two of us we have used about 100 of these collections; we have written three books (with two more in progress) and a number of academic journal articles.  Archived papers provide an opportunity to “get behind the scenes” of the member’s office and understand politics as it happens in real time, and to collect data that are otherwise impossible to access.  These collections provide insight into the legislative process and the making of American history that, if unpreserved, will be lost to the ravages of time and benign neglect.

The papers of members of Congress are peppered throughout the country.  Considered the personal property of the member of Congress he or she, upon retirement, defeat, or death may, at their discretion, donate their papers to any willing repository.  More often than not if the member does donate their papers (remember it is at their discretion) they wind up at a university in the member’s old district or state.

In most cases there is little or no funding made available to organize and preserve these collections, unless the member provides it or another donor can be found. Hundreds or thousands of boxes (depending on how long the member served, whether they served in the House or Senate, and how good they were about saving their files) arrive at the university library.[2]  The library may or may not have a dedicated archivist on staff; if they do the chances are good that the archivist is not trained to cope with collections as large and complex as those that come from a member’s office.[3] 

For these paper collections to be useful to students, academics, and others they must be processed and described and that costs money; money for staff, space, proper storage, and the like. 

The research value of the two collections is beyond debate.  As intensive users of these resources we guarantee that we will be among the first to exploit the immense research potential of these collections.  Senator Kennedy’s papers will provide insight into some of the most important legislation to pass through Congress in the last 40 years: Voting Rights, Immigration Laws, health care policy, and much more.  Representative Murtha’s papers will provide tremendous insight into the appropriations process and defense policy among other topics.

Does it take a multimillion dollar investment?  In most cases, no; but in these two cases Congress has taken the extra step of investing in centers that memorializes these two important figures and will provide a service to the broader community.  The Kennedy the Institute for the U.S. Senate is a one-of-a-kind center dedicated to the study of the Senate; there is no center in the country devoted to the study of the Senate.  Relative to the U.S. House the Senate receives little scholarly attention; a center focused on the study of the Senate could promote more intensive study of the Senate and, more importantly, provide a context for better educating the public on this complex institution.  Students at U. Mass Boston, and visitors from around the country—many of whom are visiting Boston to learn more about its rich history and place in the story of America—will have the opportunity to learn more about the Senate. 

Over the last several decades it has become increasingly difficult to convince students of the value of public service; we know from experience. The pervasive message coming out of our politics is that “government is the enemy.”  Who wants to work for “the enemy?”  The Murtha Center for Public Service (like the Stennis Center at Mississippi State University) could provide leadership in promoting public service as a career path, not only in Western Pennsylvania but throughout the country. 

In our view the mission that each of these centers will undertake is important to the national interest.  What is more important than understanding our democratic institutions and working in service to the public?  If anything we would advocate for more centers pursuing such lofty goals.  Better understanding of our national institutions helps democratic citizens develop trust in these institutions, understand the potential and the limitations of our political institutions, and inoculates them against demagoguery aimed at tearing down these bulwarks of democracy.

But, one might ask: “Are there programs within the federal government, subject to peer review, that could fund such projects?” Yes; but they are woefully underfunded.  Furthermore, because they are peer reviewed there is a built-in bias against using the funds to preserve the collections of “political elites.” For decades the academic study of history has focused on “public history”—shying away from “great man” theories of history—exhibiting a preference for focusing on collaborations with the public that preserve the collective history of groups, movements, and the like.  Thus, all things being equal, the Grateful Dead Archive at the University of Santa Cruz likely would receive competitive funding before an archive focused on a member of Congress.

One might also ask: “Could Congress create a program that would fund institutions that receive these collections in a more routine way; in a way that does not require an earmark?” Absolutely; but pundits, op-ed pages, and groups like Taxpayers for Common Sense would be lining up to criticize Congress for spending money on its former members, and scrutinizing the choice of which university got the papers.  Critics of Congress would, no doubt, concoct conspiracy theories and check with the Federal Election Commission to see how much money employees of the university donated to the member’s electoral campaigns over her career and suggesting a quid pro quo arrangement.

In the end earmarks are the only effective mechanism that the Congress has for preserving these collections and promoting larger goals like studying the Senate or promoting public service.  Rather than discouraging Congress from such action we should be encouraging Congress to enact a policy aimed at funding the preservation of the congressional collections and promoting the study of our extraordinary representative institution.



[1] Taxpayers for Common Sense Weekly Wastebasket, “Uncle Sam Shouldn’t Bankroll Lawmaker Libraries” http://www.taxpayer.net/search_by_category.php?action=view&proj_id=3692&category=Wastebasket&type=Project, accessed August 6, 2010.
[2] The congressional papers of former Representative, Senator, Vice Presidential and Presidential Candidate Bob Dole (R-KS) reportedly filled an entire railway boxcar!
[3] The challenges associated with these collections spring, in part, from the fact that a member’s office is akin to a small business.  They handle hundreds or thousands of communications with constituents every week and employ several (to dozens) of staff to track public policy issues and legislation.  The Congressional Papers Roundtable is a formal grouping within the Society of American Archivists specializing in issues specifically related to the complexities of organizing and preserving congressional papers collections.  [As a follower of their email list I have seen quite a few emails from librarians that read “We just received this enormous collection of documents. Help!  What do I do now?!” –SQK]

Thursday, August 5, 2010

Reflections on Pork and Credit-Claiming in the Ruins of Ancient Rome

by Sean Kelly

When he died Senator Robert Byrd reportedly had 11 post offices and 2 airports in the state of West Virginia named after him.  After the death of Senator Ted Kennedy--owing to an appropriations earmark placed in the Defense Appropriations bill--Boston, Massachusetts became the future home of a center for the study of the U.S. Senate named for the Senator. The main terminal of the airport in Anchorage, Alaska carries the name of Senator Ted Stevens. Entering Scranton, Pennsylvania one drives into town on the Joseph McDade Highway; also in Pennsylvania one can cruise the spacious Bud Schuster Highway.

Ted Stevens Anchorage International
Airport. Photo by the author
For many Americans the appearance of the name of a member of Congress (or any other politician) on a public works project is particularly objectionable; it smacks of self-promotion. Congressional earmarks are often used to fund these kinds of projects. Cast as the “corrupt byproducts” of the legislative process, earmarks and the projects that they fund are often considered illustrative of the “obsession” that members of Congress have with reelection. In the examples cited above the member of Congress is explicitly memorialized by having their name posted on their achievement. In many, many other cases members of Congress claim credit for their accomplishments in press releases, by pointing to them in town hall meetings, and stump speeches as demonstrations of the members’ concern for their constituents’ welfare.

Credit-claiming is often referred to as if it were a behavior unique to American politicians who seek to attach their names (figuratively and sometimes literally) to particularized material benefits that they deliver to their constituencies.[1]


Credit-claiming is more common across space and time than many Americans might think.  A research group based at the State University of New York, Albany is engaged in a cross-national examination of “pork” in a cross section of countries.[2]  Traveling under a variety of names, and generated by different processes, “pork” in other countries is similarly an opportunity for representatives to be patrons of local projects.[3]  From a comparative perspective the fundamental insight of this group is that pork and credit-claiming are not unusual features of American politics, but are more general features of many representative systems.

So I should not have been surprised (though of course I was) when, on a recent trip to Italy, I came across evidence of “pork” in the middle of ruins of ancient Rome. On our second day in Rome we made the obligatory pilgrimage to the Roman Coliseum.  As I stood outside its walls looking over the massive structure, which would be considered an amazing feat of engineering in any era, the first thought that entered my mind (not surprising for a political scientist who studies pork) was: “I know this. This is an enormous public works project!” 

Engraving from the Roman Coliseum.
Photo by the author.
Upon entering I was quickly drawn to an engraved marble slab with the name of a long-forgotten Roman Senator who used his position and his patronage to support this central feature of Roman society and entertainment. Having his name on display helped him to maintain his position within Roman society; such patronage was expected of Roman Senators.  With his name on full public display this Senator communicated to the people who visited the Coliseum (which included a wide swath of Roman society) his position of authority within the social structure of Rome and the Empire, and promoting himself and his family more generally, indicating his power, and securing his family‘s future position in the Roman hierarchy.  In short, this Senator was claiming credit.

Of course the most dramatic public works projects throughout Rome belonged to the Emperor.  These projects were meant to benefit the public (through employment and public accommodation), promote commerce, and to entertain, to be sure, but also to project the power of the leader by illustrating his piousness, his conquests in war, and his beneficence (real or imagined) toward the people, while casting his image in the broader context of Roman history.  The images in the reliefs that decorate the arches, buildings, and spires were meant to both “claim credit” for public works and to project authority.[4]

At a fundamental level the structures and monuments of Rome--bearing the images, names, and actions of Emperors and Senators--reflect a constant in politics: the desire on the part of political leaders to gain public recognition for providing public benefits.

Alexander Hamilton writing in the Federalist Papers--arguing against including term limits for the president in the Constitution--asserted that “…the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct…”[5] He suggested that it was the vanity of politicians that would cause them to “make the best use” of his time in power, fearing the negative judgment of the public by way of electoral defeat, public scorn, and perhaps derision.  From his point of view it the was the vanity of politicians that would make a politician “unwilling to risk the consequences of an abuse of his opportunities [in office]”--where he would be judged in the light of history.

There are, of course, hazards in comparing ancient Rome and contemporary American politics.[6] But wandering through the remains, and observing the repeated examples of overt credit-claiming, reminded me that there are some things about politics that remain fairly constant.


[1] As David Mayhew reminds us, it is critical that the claim of credit be credible, that is, that it is within the realm of possibility that the political actor could credibly deliver the material benefit through his or her efforts.  David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1974.
[2] Robert Nakamura, Mark Baskin, and Malcolm Russell-Einhorn, “Constituency Development Funds and Legislative Strengthening.”  Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA April 2010.
[3] This seems to be the case especially in political systems where representation is based on geography, that is, where the representative is charged with promoting the interests of a population contained in a particular geographic district or region (in the U.S. case, a congressional district or state). 
[4] Lest one believe it unlikely that an Emperor would deign to “credit claim,” Augustus “boasted in his Res Gestae (19-20 and the summary 2-3) of repairing eighty-two temples, of renovating all five of Rome's existing aqueducts and of restoring the two key basilicas, the Julia and the Aemilia.” M. K. Thornton “Julio-Claudian Building Programs: Eat, Drink, and Be Merry”  Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 35,1:35.
[5] Federalist Papers #72 “The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered.”
[6] For instance, in Rome projects were funded directly from the coffers of individuals whether gained through the spoils of war or by collecting rents from the lower classes, whereas in the U.S. projects are funded through a public treasury stocked by way of taxation.  Public works in Rome often were the products of slave labor so that, unlike contemporary public works, they were not necessarily solely intended to promote employment for Roman citizens, though they provided substantial economic stimulus nonetheless (see “Julian Claudian Building Programs“ and M.K. Thornton and R.L. Thornton  “ The Financial Crisis of A.D. 33: A Keynesian Depression?”  The Journal of Economic History, 50,3:655-662).

Thursday, July 22, 2010

The Paradox of Earmark Reform

Earlier this year House Appropriations Committee Chairman Dbavid Obey (D-WI) announced a ban on earmarks for private for-profit companies in House Appropriations bills.  Like earlier earmark reforms--public disclosure of earmark requests, public posting of earmark requests, and listing earmarks in committee reports, to name a few--the aim of Chairman Obey’s dictum was to increase public confidence in the appropriations process by responding to a demand of Washington-based “watchdog groups.” Over the past several decades these groups have mercilessly attacked the practice of congressional earmarks arguing , without much supporting evidence, that they increase federal spending, are inherently wasteful, and inevitably lead to corruption.

Ink and indignation are predictably hemorrhaging from Washington, DC over the recent revelation that private firms have discovered loopholes in Obey’s ban allowing them to gain access to earmark funds.  Reporters from The New York Times and the Seattle Times cite cases where for-profit companies formed non-profit organizations eligible for earmarked funds, and other cases where for-profit companies have partnered with non-profits or universities that assist their research, allowing the companies to skirt the ban.[1] These strategies have been pilloried by watchdogs and the media as additional examples of the “corruptness” of earmarks, and the basis of repeated demands for further earmark reform or even a complete ban on the practice.

Obey’s ban while well-intentioned was ill-advised.  The Senate Appropriations Committee did not enact a similar ban, which provided an immediate alternative strategy for private companies seeking earmarks; just approach the Senate.  Further, favoring non-profit organizations over for-profit businesses is an arbitrary policy.  The marketplace of good ideas does not observe strict adherence to the for-profit/not for-profit distinction that Obey codified in the reform.  For-profit companies are often developing important products and technologies that are worthy of public support.  One example is the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MRAP) that is widely used in Iraq to protect soldiers from improvised explosive devices.  With only one customer (the Pentagon) the original designers and producers of the MRAP relied on earmark funding (in part) to develop and produce the first vehicles.  With design and production capability in place, when the need for MRAP vehicles in Iraq became obvious large-scale production could quickly ramp up.  In the absence of earmarks it likely would have taken years to design, test, and produce the MRAP vehicle that has saved the lives of thousands of soldiers.

The more fundamental problem with Obey’s ban springs from what we refer to as the “paradox of reform.”  The intention of the reform was to increase public confidence in the earmarking process by responding to one of the many objections of watchdog groups; the result, inevitably, is precisely the opposite. Opponents of earmarks use the imperfect results of the reform to intensify their attacks on congressional appropriations earmarks and their reports, amplified by the media, drive down public trust in the process. This paradox was evident following the first round of earmark reforms.  Rules that required listing earmarks in committee reports provided easy access to earmark data that, when combined with data on campaign contributions from the Federal Election Commission, could form the basis of a contributions-for-earmarks conspiracy, which is not well supported by the data (but disseminated by the groups and dutifully reported by the media).[2]  In this round of reform, for-profit companies skirt an ill-conceived and impossible to enforce reform; the resulting examples of the “failure of the reform” are presented as evidence of the “corruption” that sparked demands for the reform from the group in the first place. Watchdogs, in turn, demand new stricter reforms, supported by predictable public outrage,  with the eventual aim of driving Congress out of the earmarking business altogether (and, by the way, their loud objections do not hurt their fundraising efforts).

In the final analysis the only way to satisfy earmark critics is to ban appropriations earmarks altogether.  This would irreparably upset the Constitutional order envisioned by the framers of the Constitution who granted the power of the purse to the Congress to make government spending more responsive to public demands, and to balance congressional power against presidential power.  In the absence of appropriations earmarks the only recourse available for federal funding of local and national priorities are appeals by citizens to a faceless, non-transparent, and electorally unaccountable federal bureaucracy incapable of appreciating the priorities and concerns of people in communities across the country (except, perhaps, those cities, towns, and organizations with the resources to hire expert grant writers to help them jump through the hoops of the federal grants and contracts process).  Concentrating the power of the purse in the executive branch would further inflate the power of the executive branch and undermine the power of Congress, the people‘s branch.

Most of the cases of earmark abuse that were uncovered (and there are fewer than most of the public would believe) came to light through the legislative process itself; the legislative process has many of the features of a self-regulating system.  Reforms that improve transparency are good; most in Congress and most in the lobbying community supports reforms that improve transparency.  Reforms without a basis in policy, or that are meant to appease watchdog groups are ill-advised at best and, at worst, could erode the unique balance between the public and our political institutions that our founders sought to embody in the Constitution.


[1] Eric Lipton and Ron Nixon, “Companies find ways to bypass ban on earmarks” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/05/us/politics/05earmarks.html accessed July 4, 2010; David Heath “Congressman Dicks finds way around earmarks rule” http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2012294255_dicks07.html
The Seattle Times accessed July 6, 2010.

[2] Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly
“Earmarks and campaign contributions: less than meets the eye.”  http://www.cheesefactoriesonthemoon.blogspot.com accessed July 6, 2010.


Sunday, July 11, 2010

Interview on LATalkRadio.com

We did our first interview about the book with LATalkRadio.com hosted by Brendan Huffman.  Click the title above to give it a listen.  It runs about 20 minutes.

Wednesday, July 7, 2010

Four Myths About Congressional Earmarks

Never has a quote so accurately summed up the arguments of earmark critics, and rarely is a quote as demonstrably false as this one from a New York Times article published on July 4, 2010.[1]
Critics say spending on earmarks, which added $16 billion to the federal budget last year, diverts money from higher priorities, typically does not require competitive bids and is often directed to experimental research that will never be used.
The authors of the article echo the arguments made by “watchdog” groups failing to critically assess their statements.  In this essay we take on the four myths about congressional earmarks that are embedded in this quote.
When the appropriations subcommittees make spending decisions they begin with a pot of money, a 302(b) allocation. This is the pot of money available to the subcommittee to spend on the programs that are funded by their bill. It is up to the subcommittee to decide on what this money will be spent.  A small percentage of this money will be “earmarked” for some specific purposes.  The subcommittee has not “added” money to the pot.  Earmarks do not add spending the budget anymore than choosing to purchase a box of pasta instead of a pound of bananas (i.e., earmarking funds for pasta) adds to one’s bill at the supermarket.  In fact, Congress often approves spending levels lower than those requested by the president shifting some of the savings to earmarked accounts.
Critics argue that earmarks divert funding from higher priorities.  What constitutes a “higher priority” is a value judgment and the pivotal issue is: Who decides what constitutes a “higher priority”? Without explicitly stating it critics of earmarks argue that the president (relying mostly on unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats making decisions under less than transparent circumstances) should decide spending priorities and Congress should simply rubber stamp those decisions.  In granting the “power of the purse” to the Congress the framers of the Constitution sought to situate this power as closely to the people as possible, to make government democratically accountable for spending decisions for setting priorities.
Furthermore, critics of earmarks fail to support their contention that the executive branch makes “better” decisions about priorities than does the Congress. For instance, as the problem of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) became apparent early in the Iraq War the lack of armor for military vehicles was defended by the Bush Administration.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously said “you go to war with the military you have.”  Being kept alive by earmarks included in the Defense Appropriations bill—to the chagrin of the White House—was  an idea that might help soldiers in the field; the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle.  MRAPs were not a “priority” of the executive (the repository of superior decision-makers), but Congress funneled funding into the project and ultimately saved soldiers’ lives in Iraq.  Likewise, the Predator Drone, which is used widely in Afghanistan and Iraq and is acknowledged for saving the lives of American soldiers, was resisted by the Pentagon and "pushed" on them through congressional earmarks.  Who wants an unmanned attack drone?  It is now one of the main arrows in the quiver of those fighting terrorism abroad.
Critics complain about earmarks being used for “experimental research that will never be used.”  To some extent this is probably true; some ideas will pan out while others will not; but that is why they are called experiments.  As academics we have hard drives full of data that were collected and never produced meaningful results; papers that were written and never published; grant proposals that were written and never funded; and the list goes on.  Experimentation and failure (and success) are natural components of the process of discovery.  Making precisely this point Albert Einstein famously said: “If we knew what we were doing, it wouldn't be called research, would it?”  Anyone engaged in research will tell you that there are no guarantees of success.  Are there any successes associated with earmarks?  What bigger gamble than to earmark initial funding to map the human genome—considered an impossibility by most of the scientific community in the 1980s—which ultimately produced medical and technological discoveries that will fuel biotechnology for decades to come.
            In one regard critics of earmarks are somewhat correct: Earmarked funds are often awarded without competitive bidding.  However even this requires some context.  First, the executive bureaucracy often grants money without competitive bidding (think here of the billions and billions spend on no-bid contracts associated with the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars).  Somehow the critics would have us believe that non-competitive grants from the executive are superior to congressional earmarks, despite the fact that no-bid contracts through the executive are far less transparent than congressional earmark awards.  Second, as we discuss at much greater length in our book, earmark requests do compete with one another within the appropriations process.  Despite popular belief not all earmark requests are granted.  Our research on requests for earmarks in the Interior and Military Construction subcommittees suggests that less than one in four earmarks are granted.  The earmarks that are included in appropriations emerge from a brutally competitive environment.
            We end this essay as we ended our first essay: “The use of appropriations earmarks is one political issue where the media consistently fails to exercise balance in their coverage.  While media outlets routinely take pains to seek out conflicting views on even the most widely accepted truths (e.g., global climate change, evolution), it is rare to hear dissenting voices on the issue of appropriations earmarks.”
           





[1] Eric Lipton and Ron Nixon, “Companies Find Ways to Bypass Ban on Earmarks” New York Times July 4, 2010.  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/05/us/politics/05earmarks.html?hp

Wednesday, June 23, 2010

Why Cheese Factories on the Moon?

It seems like a complete non-sequitur: Cheese Factories on the Moon.  The title does not exactly scream “earmarks” or even “politics.”  The first publisher to offer us a contract for our book insisted on a title change, believing it would be too hard to market the book.  We waited for a second offer.  Paradigm Publishers and our editor Jennifer Knerr offered us a contract.  Our first question to her was: “Do we get to keep our title?”  When she said “yes” it was a done deal; we quickly signed the contract before she could change her mind. Maybe it was an indication of Jennifer’s belief in the project, or an indication of her complete recklessness, or our own recklessness—maybe we worked hard on a book that will never sell!
Why were we so insistent on keeping the title?  In part to communicate to potential readers that while we were taking on a serious subject—why earmarks are good for American democracy, which is the subtitle of the book—we intended to balance the  seriousness of the subject matter with good humor, a contrarian spirit, and some irreverence.  Hopefully the title also communicates accessibility.   Political science scholarship is often opaque and, as a result, irrelevant to the public discourse.  We wanted this to be a book that could be read by students and people who want to hear the other side of the argument about earmarks (yes there is another side to the argument but one would almost never know that).  If we are lucky maybe we can influence the public debate in some small way.
            But the title serves another purpose.  It is inspired by former Texas Republican Senator Phil Gramm’s state was home to the superconducting supercollider project in, which many saw as a pork-infested boondoggle.  He infamously said regarding his support for the supercollider:
As I am fond of saying, if the Congress had a vote on whether to build a cheese factory on the Moon, I would oppose it based on what I know now, and I cannot imagine the circumstance under which I would support it. But on the other hand, if Congress in its lack of wisdom decided to start a cheese factory on the Moon, I would want a Texas firm to do the engineering, I would want a Texas construction firm to do the construction, I would want the milk to come from Texas cows, and I would want the celestial distribution center to be in Dallas, Texas, or College Station, Texas, or somewhere else in my State.[1]
Senator Gramm’s quote reflects the tension that members of Congress face with regard to simultaneously serving the interests of the people who elected them and that they represent, and serving the national interest. It may not be in the national interest to build a cheese factory on the Moon; it may be a colossal waste of time and resources.  But the American electoral system is, by design, based on geography; members of Congress are elected by voters grouped into distinct geographic constituencies (House districts and states).  If lunar cheese production becomes the policy of the nation, a representative has a responsibility to pursue the maximum possible benefit for the people who sent him (in this case) to the U.S. Senate; for Gramm the people of Texas.
Gramm’s fanciful example also brings into view the important, if misunderstood, distinction between authorizing legislation and appropriations.  The most consequential decision that Congress makes is whether to authorize the building and operation of an orbiting cheese factory.  In so doing the Congress makes the project a priority.  Appropriations earmarks (directing spending to particular functions, hence the term “congressionally directed spending”) are not about how the money will be spent—that decision is made well before actual appropriations are made, when the program is authorized—but where the money will be spent; will the money be spent in Texas or Maine, Washington or Florida, or somewhere else?
Someone has to decide where the money will be spent.  Critics of earmarks prefer that the executive branch have exclusive domain over these decisions.  But there is no reason to believe that the bureaucracy is a “politics-free zone” in which all decisions are made with sole recourse to the objective technocratic expertise and cost-benefit analyses.  Presidents and other executive branch actors could easily use their power to award projects to the districts and states of influential members of Congress, or to benefit states that are important to his Electoral College coalition.  And the executive branch is far less transparent than the Congress. Maybe it was a coincidence that in November 1988 the Department of Energy announced its decision to locate the superconducting supercollider in Texas, the home-state of Vice President (and soon-to-be-President) George H.W. Bush, Senator Phil Gramm, and then-Speaker of the House Jim Wright.  Maybe it was not.
The focus on earmarks amounts to political sleight-of-hand.  Pennywise and pound-foolish critics of earmarks misdirect the public’s attention.  They cause the public to despair over congressionally directed spending (earmarks), while ignoring the far more consequential decision: the decision to authorize building a cheese factory on the Moon.



[1]  Adam Meyerson, "The Genius of Ordinary People," Interview with Sen. Phil Gramm, Heritage Foundation Policy Review 50 (Fall 1989): 11-12.

Wednesday, June 9, 2010

Earmarks and Campaign Contributions: Less Than Meets the Eye

Last week Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS) released a report on the relationship between earmarks and campaign contributions.  TCS purports to show that campaign contributions to members of Congress are associated with the earmarks that members get for their campaign contributors.[1] 

The TCS report relies heavily on a narrative that frames earmarks as an illegitimate exercise of legislative power undertaken by craven politicians obsessed with getting reelected (a narrative that is widely shared by the public).  TCS (and its doppelganger Citizens Against Government Waste) uses media outlets, starved for content, as a megaphone. 

Fundamentally transformed over the last several decades, most media outlets do not have the resources to engage in in-depth reporting and they capitalize on the ability of groups like TCS to provide seemingly in-depth political analysis without critical review.  The media also shares with TCS a cynical view of politicians.  Resource scarcity combined with a shared narrative, and the media’s need to feed the 24-hour news cycle, produces a “perfect storm” of sensational and misleading coverage.

In a story titled “Earmarks set aside for campaign donors, report finds” in The Washington Post the results of the TCS study were dutifully recounted punctuated with quotes from the leading voice of Taxpayers for Common Sense, Steve Ellis suggesting a quid pro quo between earmarks and contributions (as the title of the article suggests): "In too many cases campaign contributors are able to donate thousands of dollars and get millions of dollars back in earmarks."[2]

These stories echo—maintaining the essential narrative structure promoted by the groups—in local media outlets by focusing attention on local representatives who are held up as examples of “big spenders who trade earmarks for campaign contributions.”  For instance, citing this study The Seattle Weekly reported on Norm Dicks’ earmarks and campaign contributions highlighting the supposed quid pro quo angle noting that his “giving [earmarks] results in a lot of receiving [campaign contributions].”[3]  Stories like these further amplify TCS’ message.

Taking this report at face value a reader is led to believe that the vast majority of campaign contributions come from the recipients of earmarks: That is simply not true.

The TCS report does not mention that about 200 members of Congress (almost half) either did not request or receive earmarks, or did not receive contributions from individuals and organizations associated with their earmarks, according to the data.  Failing to mention that fact supports the central narrative of the report—that all members are linking earmarks to campaign contributions—but it is misleading.

The report fails to provide adequate context for the fundraising data.  Jim Moran (D-VA) received over $71,000 in campaign contributions (placing him #1 in that category) and is ranked #4 in total earmarks.  Seventy-one thousand dollars is a lot of money; there is no doubt about it.  But according to the Federal Election Commission in this electoral cycle Moran raised over $700,000 dollars for his campaign.  Seventy-one thousand dollars is a lot of money, but it is a relatively small proportion of his overall war chest. 

Using the TCS data for Fiscal Year 2010 we added Federal Election Commission data on total campaign contributions for the 2010 election cycle. Of the 233 members of Congress included in the database, less than one percent (precisely 0.8%) of their campaign contributions was raised from individuals or PACs associated with their earmarks.  Put another way, 99.2% of campaign contributions are not tied to earmarks in this study. If we include the 202 members who did not receive any contributions associated with their earmarks the percentage of campaign contributions associated with earmarks is less than one-half of one percent.  If 99.2% of campaign contributions come from somewhere else it does not make a lot of sense to hand-wring over where 0.8% comes from.  Our campaign finance system is clearly broken; blaming it on earmarks leaves TCS barking up the wrong tree.

Moran’s case is an outlier; it is the exception not the rule.  The average member of Congress in the TCS data (among those who raised any money at all) collected a little more than $5,000 in campaign contributions from interests receiving earmarks.  This is compared to the average war chest of these same members, which was $875,000.  The most common amounts raised by the members according to TCS data? Eighteen members raised $500 and 17 raised $1,000.  It seems unlikely that members of Congress would trade hundreds and millions of dollars in earmarks for such paltry sums.

The use of appropriations earmarks is one political issue where the media consistently fails to exercise balance in their coverage.  While media outlets routinely take pains to seek out conflicting views on even the most widely accepted truths (e.g., global climate change, evolution), it is rare to hear dissenting voices on the issue of appropriations earmarks. 

To the degree that the media trumpets, unchallenged, the results of reports like this one from Taxpayers for Common Sense they do the public a great disservice.




[1] “Exploring the Relationship Between Earmarks and Campaign Contributions” accessed June 7, 2010: http://taxpayer.net/search_by_category.php?action=view&proj_id=3533&category=Earmarks&type=Project
[2] J.W. Farnham “Earmarks set aside for campaign donors, report finds” accessed June 7, 2010:
[3] Rick Anderson “Norm Dicks' Earmarks Pay Campaign Dividends” The Seattle Weekly, accessed June 7, 2010: http://blogs.seattleweekly.com/dailyweekly/2010/06/norm_dicks_earmarks_pay_campai.php